




This work was supported by the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation 







LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES 
 




CHAPTER 1  
COVID-19 and Populism: A Sui Generis Crisis 
Giuliano Bobba and Nicolas Hubé 
 
CHAPTER 2 
UK: Between managed moderation and far-right conspiracy theories 
Osman Sahin, and Bogdan Ianosev 
 
CHAPTER 3 
Spain: Is ideology back in populist discourse? 
Jaume Magre, Lluís Medir, and Esther Pano 
 
CHAPTER 4 
Italy: Populist in the mirror, (de)politicizing the COVID-19 from government and opposition 
Arturo Bertero, and Antonella Seddone 
 
CHAPTER 5 
France: Governmental unpreparedness as a discursive opportunity for populists 
Martin Baloge, and Nicolas Hubé 
 
CHAPTER 6 
Germany: The AfD’s Staggering between Reason and Resistance 
Oliver W. Lembcke 
 
CHAPTER 7 
Hungary: Crisis as usual - Populist governance and the pandemic  
Márton Bene, and Zsolt Boda 
 
CHAPTER 8 
Czech Republic: Running the State like a Family Business 
Ondřej Císař, and Michal Kubát 
 
CHAPTER 9 




Between mitigation and dramatization: The effect of the COVID-19 crisis on populists’ 
discourses and strategies 








1.1 Contradictions, Decisive Interventions and Populist Interventions 
1.2 Politicization of public problems/issues 
1.3 Impact of COVID-19 in the cases selected (10 June 2020) 
1.4 Populists parties in the cases selected 
2.1 Main UK political parties (>5% in the last European election)  
2.2 COVID-19 pandemic in UK 
3.1 Main Spanish political parties (>5% in the last general election) 
3.2 COVID-19 pandemic in Spain 
4.1 Main Italian political parties (> 5% in the last General election) 
4.2 COVID-19 pandemic in Italy 
5.1 Main French political parties (>5% in the last general election) 
5.2 COVID-19 pandemic in France 
6.1 Main German political parties (>5% in the last general election) 
6.2 COVID-19 pandemic in Germany 
7.1 Main Hungarian political parties (>5% in the last general election) 
7.2 COVID-19 pandemic in Hungary 
8.1 Main Czech political parties (>5% in the last general election) 
8.2 COVID-19 pandemic in Czech Republic 
9.1 Main Polish political parties (>5% in the last general election) 
9.2 COVID-19 pandemic in Poland 





2.1 Daily death toll and new cases in UK 
3.1 Daily death toll and new cases in Spain 
4.1 Daily death toll and new cases in Italy 
5.1 Daily death toll and new cases in France 
6.1 Daily death toll and new cases in Germany 
7.1 Daily death toll and new cases in Hungary 
8.1 Daily death toll and new cases in Czech Republic 
9.1 Daily death toll and new cases in Poland 
10.1 Map of European populist discourse faced with the COVID-19 crisis 









GIULIANO BOBBA, Associate Professor, Department of Cultures, Politics and Society and Affiliate, 
Collegio Carlo Alberto, University of Turin 
 





MARTIN BALOGE, Post-doctoral researcher, Centre for Research on Mediations (CREM), University 
of Lorraine, Metz 
 
MÁRTON BENE, Research fellow, Centre for Social Sciences - Centre of Excellence of the 
Hungarian Academy of Sciences, and assistant professor, ELTE Law Faculty, Budapest 
 
ARTURO BERTERO, Research Fellow, Department Cultures, Politics and Society, University of Turin 
 
ZSOLT BODA, Research professor, Centre for Social Sciences - Centre of Excellence of the 
Hungarian Academy of Sciences, and associate professor, ELTE Law Faculty, Budapest 
 
ONDŘEJ CÍSAŘ, Associate Professor, Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University, Prague 
 
BOGDAN IANOSEV, PhD Candidate, Glasgow Caledonian University 
 
MICHAL KUBÁT, Professor, Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University, Prague 
 
OLIVER W. LEMBCKE, Professor of Political Science, Ruhr-University Bochum 
 
ARTUR LIPIŃSKI, Associate Professor, Faculty of Political Science and Journalism, Adam Mickiewicz 
University, Poznań 
 
JAUME MAGRE. Associate Professor in Political Science at Universitat de Barcelona, director of the 
Carles Pi i Sunyer Foundation 
 
LLUÍS MEDIR. Associate Professor in Political Science at Universitat de Barcelona 
 
ESTHER PANO. Assistant Professor in Political Science and member of the Carles Pi i Sunyer 
Foundation, Barcelona 
 
OSMAN SAHIN, Research Fellow, Glasgow Caledonian University 
 
ANTONELLA SEDDONE, Assistant Professor in Political Science, Department Cultures, Politics and 





LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
 
Translated Name of the Party Original Name of the Party Acronym 
United Kingdom 
United Kingdom Independence Party United Kingdom Independence Party UKIP 
Brexit Party Brexit Party Brexit Party 
Spain 
Spanish Socialist Workers' Party Partido Socialista Obrero Español PSOE 
People's Party Partido Popular PP 
VOX VOX VOX 
United We Can Unidas Podemos PP 
Citizens Ciudadanos C’s 
Italy 
Go Italy Forza Italia FI 
Brothers of Italy Fratelli d’Italia FdI 
League Lega Lega 
Five Star Movement Movimento 5 Stelle M5S 
Democratic Party Partito Democratico PD 
France 
National Rally Rassemblement National RN 
Indomitable France La France Insoumise LFI 
The Republic on the Move La République en Marche LREM 
MODEM MODEM MODEM 
Democrats and Independants’ Union Union des Démocrates et Indépendants UDI 
Socialist Party Parti Socialiste PS 
Greens Les Verts EELV 
The Republicans Les Républicains LR 
Germany 
Alternative for Germany Alternative für Deutschland AfD 
Federal Minister of Health Bundesministerium für Gesundheit BMG 
Christian Democratic Union Christlich Demokratische Union 
Deutschlands 
CDU 
Christian Social Union in Bavaria Christlich-Soziale Union in Bayern CSU 
Liberal Democratic Party Freie Demokratische Partei  F.D.P. 
Green Party Bündnis 90/Die Grünen Grüne 
The Left Party Die Linke Linke 
Robert Koch Institute Robert Koch Institut  RKI 
Social Democratic Party Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands SPD 
Hungary 
Fidesz Fidesz Fidesz 
Christian Democratic People’s Party Kereszténydemokrata Néppárt KDNP 
Hungarian Socialist Party Magyar Szocialista Párt MSZP 
For a Better Hungary Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom Jobbik 
Democratic Coalition Demokratikus Koalíció DK 
Another Politics Is Possible Lehet Más a Politika LMP 
Momentum Momentum Momentum 
Dialogue Párbeszéd P 
Czech Republic 
ANO 2011 ANO 2011 ANO 
Freedom and Direct Democracy Svoboda a přímá demokracie SPD 
Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia Komunistická strana Čech a Moravy KSČM 
Poland 
Law and Justice Prawo i Sprawiedliwość PiS 
Confederation ‘Freedom and Independence’ Konfederacja ‘Wolność i Niepodległość’ Confederation 
Civic Platform Platforma Obywatelska PO 
Polish People’s Party Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe PSL 









The aim of the paper is to elucidate how PiS and Confederation, two right-wing populist parties dealt 
with the double challenge of the COVID-19 crisis and the presidential elections during a pandemic. 
The chapter argues that the COVID-19 crisis had a significant impact on the strategies undertaken by 
PiS during the presidential campaign. First, it prompted PiS to take unconstitutional and illegal 
measures to prevent the delay of the elections, a scenario promoted by the opposition. Secondly, the 
crisis also opened a window of opportunity for the governing camp allowing PiS to profit from the 
‘rally effect’. As for Confederation, the second populist actor, the crisis did not fundamentally affect 
its strategy for becoming more mainstream. The group used the pandemic to build the image of a 
competent and moderate actor. In addition, the restrictions of the crisis created an opportunity for the 
libertarian aspects of the party’s agenda.  
 




When the COVID-19 pandemic hit Poland during the presidential campaign (elections had been 
scheduled for the 10th of May), all political parties were completely focused on the electoral 
competition and the health crisis was, to a large extent, overshadowed by other issues. The stakes 
were high. For Law and Justice (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość – PiS), the victory of its candidate, 
incumbent Andrzej Duda, would allow the party to advance its radical reforms (e.g. continue the 
controversial reforms of the judiciary and impose limits on media freedom); for the oppositional 
Confederation (Konfederacja), the smallest group in parliament, a good electoral result of its 
candidate Krzysztof Bosak could provide an opportunity to promote its party radical agenda (i.e. anti-
LGBTQ, euro-rejectionist, anti-semitic and xenophobic slogans) and would be a good starting point 
for future parliamentary elections. PiS used the health crisis to present its leadership as skilful and 
competent and their decisions as non-political. They also tried to take advantage of the uneven 
political field created by the pre-emptive COVID-19 measures which had imposed limits on the 
campaigns of opposition candidates. However, the health crisis and its economic consequences also 
had drawbacks for the incumbents and opened a window of opportunity for all opposition parties, 
including Confederation.  
The aim of the paper is to elucidate how PiS and Confederation, two right-wing populist parties who 
differed in their institutional positions, dealt with the double challenge of the COVID-19 crisis and 
the presidential elections during a pandemic. It presents the political context, the evolution of pre-
emptive measures and policies used to prevent the spread of COVID-19, discursive reactions of the 




1. Political context  
The genesis of the dominant position of PiS on the Polish political scene may be traced back to its 
success in the presidential and parliamentary elections of 2005, which allowed it to form a 
government and decisively increased the salience of its right-wing populist message (Pankowski, 
2011; Stanley & Cześnik 2019). Since its very beginning on 2001, the core of PiS’ agenda was 
constituted by the idea of a strong state and focus on fighting corruption which underpinned its calls 
for the 'decommunization' of the state (Lipiński, 2016). According to the party’s causal story (Stone, 
1989), the Polish transformation was a result of a collusion between the communist and liberal elites 
 
 
in 1989, which not only affected the quality of the newly-born Polish democracy and free-market 
economy, but also brought about a climate of moral disease in social life. This agenda helped PiS get 
into parliament in 2001 and form a government in 2005. As the major opposition party, following its 
premature loss of power in 2007, PiS continued to employ the populist division between the nation 
and the establishment and constructed the crisis, particularly following the Smolensk catastrophe in 
2010 (Moffitt, 2015). Incessantly accusing Donald Tusk’s government of ruining the country and 
weakening its sovereignty in the international arena, they managed a double electoral victory in the 
2015 presidential and parliamentary elections, resulting in 235 out of 430 seats in the lower chamber 
of parliament. The extensive social spending programs implemented by the PiS-led government 
helped generate considerable political support and helped the party to portray itself as making good 
on electoral promises and proving more effective than its liberal predecessors.  
In the 2019 European Parliament (EP) elections and in the subsequent parliamentary elections later 
that year, PiS and its minor coalition partners (the United Right) secured a dominant position (45.4% 
of votes, and 43.59% of votes with 235 seats, accordingly) thanks to a campaign filled with 
homophobic slogans and criticisms of ‘gender ideology’, assisted by generous social spending framed 
as a people-oriented ‘revolution of dignity’. This was not, however, an out-and-out victory as PiS lost 
its majority in the Senate, the upper chamber of parliament with the power to slow down the 
legislative process. The loss of the Senate increased the importance of the presidential elections 
planned for May 2020 and the necessity to secure the re-election of Duda. Otherwise, challenged by 
the Senate and a president with veto power, PiS would not be able to continue its radical policies. At 
this time, it seemed that the political efforts of the ruling camp and the attention of the public would 
be entirely focused on this task in the forthcoming months. The emergence of COVID-19 and its 
potentially adverse outcomes for the incumbents only raised the stakes of the elections and 
determined PiS’s resistance to delay the election date. 
Another important result of the October 2019 elections was the relative success of Confederation, a 
radical right-wing party founded at the beginning of 2019 on the eve of an electoral campaign for the 
European and national parliaments, with 11 seats won in the latter (6.81% of votes). The party showed 
its ability to surpass PiS from the right flank and succeeded in forcing PiS to radicalize its message. 
Confederation's anti-systemic agenda makes it similar to many small and short-lived parties which 
appeared in Poland after 1989, using presidential elections as an opportunity structure to promote a 
radical message and relying on their ‘newness’ as an important symbolic resource (Sikk, 2012). In 
general, Confederation is a coalition of economic libertarians linked to the eccentric Janusz Korwin-
Mikke and nationalists from the National Movement. During the 2019 EP elections, the coalition was 
broadened to include anti-vaccine and pro-life activists. The populist strategy of provocation was 
articulated through anti-Semitic slogans related to the alleged Jewish wartime reparation claims 
enabled by the American JUST Act of 2017. Moreover, the campaign resorted to anti-Semitic and 
Eurosceptic slogans to accuse PiS of undermining Poland’s sovereignty by becoming servile towards 
the US and EU. Following a failure to reach the 5% parliamentary representation threshold for parties 
(they only received 4.6% of the votes), Confederation decided to significantly moderate its public 
image. In the subsequent parliamentary elections in October 2019, they presented themselves as the 
only integral right-wing force, in comparison to PiS who were shown as lacking in a real right-wing 
identity. Consequently, Confederation’s focus on anti-establishment messages, tax reductions and 
other free market slogans coupled with careful avoidance of more controversial issues brought them 
11 seats in parliament. 
 
Table 9.1 Poland’s Main political parties (>5% in the last general election) 
Political party 2019 general election  2019 European election   
 Vote shares Seats Vote shares Seats 
In power     
PiS 43.59% 235 45.38% 26 
In opposition      
 
 
Civic Coalition (PO, Modern, PL Greens)53 27.4% 124 38.47% 22 
Democratic Left Alliance* 12.56% 49 - - 
Polish People’s Party* 8.55% 30 - - 
Confederation ‘Freedom and 
Independence’ 
6.81% 11 4.55% 0 
* Initially as a part of European Coalition 
 
2. COVID-19 diffusion and political measures 
In Poland, the pre-COVID phase which lasted until the 4th of March was already marked by the 
widespread awareness of the seriousness of the health consequences of contracting the virus and the 
strong strain this would put on health systems in countries affected by the epidemic. The crisis 
management team at the Ministry of Health met for the first time on the 29th of January. In February, 
the government took a number of precautionary measures, including formalizing the team monitoring 
the COVID-19 epidemiological situation54. A special act decreed on the 3rd of March outlined 
emergency powers and responsibilities for public servants and businesses55. Importantly, the law was 
voted for almost unanimously, with Confederation being the only party which opposed it. In general, 
the government focused on monitoring, informing and adopting a number of preventive measures. 
The second phase of the state's response to the pandemic was triggered by the first case of infection, 
announced on the 4th of March by the Ministry of Health. On March 10th, i.e. six days after the first 
case, the government introduced significant limits on mass events. Between the 10th and 12th of 
March, further lockdown measures were taken, including the closure of schools and universities. A 
state of epidemic threat was announced on March 14th, two days after the first death from COVID-
19. It allowed the Minister of Health to introduce further measures to limit the movement of people. 
Declaring a state of epidemic threat allowed for an entry ban on foreigners, 14-day quarantine for 
Poles returning from abroad, limits on gatherings of over 50 people, and closing shopping malls, to 
mention but a few. On the 20th of March, given the steep growth in the number of people infected 
with COVID-19 which had already surpassed 400 cases, and the approaching Easter holiday which 
in Poland is a time of traditional family meetings, the government decided to introduce a state of 
epidemic. On the 24th of March, further limitations were imposed on gatherings which were limited 
to a maximum of two people. Exceptions to this were related to families, religious festivities, 
including masses in the Catholic Church, funerals and marriages (with a maximum of five people), 
and work places. Moreover, travelling was prohibited with the exception of travelling to your work 
or home, COVID-19 related activities or other ‘necessary everyday activities’ (e.g. shopping, visiting 
the doctor or pharmacy, and also jogging or walking). Importantly, these restrictions, broadened and 
prolonged several times through the regulations issued by the Minister of Health and Council of 
Ministers, were considered unconstitutional by the opposition, and many experts and civil society 
organizations. In their opinion, such restrictions could only be imposed within the extraordinary 
measures stipulated in the Constitution (i.e. state of emergency or state of natural disaster). However, 
due to the presidential elections scheduled for the 10th of May, the government decided not to use any 
constitutionally regulated, extraordinary measures, as this would delay the elections until 90 days 
after such a state was lifted. The ruling party did not want any delays, being fully aware that any 
unexpected consequences of the pandemic could undermine Duda's chances for re-election. All the 
opposition parties, including Confederation, PO and PSL were consistently and unanimously 
claiming that solutions adopted by PiS were unconstitutional and represented PiS as a party striving 
for power at any price. On the other hand, PiS and Duda enjoyed extraordinary support from the 
public media, resorting to polarizing discourse and portraying their opponents as a threat to national 
identity and interests.  
 
53 In the 2019 European Parliamentary elections, it started as a European Coalition together with the Polish People’s 
Party and Democratic Left Alliance. 
54 A. Kublik, Jak rząd od 9 stycznia walczył z koronawirusem. Gazeta Wyborcza, 19/03/2020. 
55 Special act anticipating coronavirus outbreak passed in Polish parliament. Notes from Poland, 3/03/2020. 
 
 
It is very difficult to distinguish the third phase of the government's response to the pandemic based 
on the death toll or the daily number of people infected which stayed at approximately same level 
during entire period under consideration. Strict precautionary measures introduced initially by the 
government kept the number of infections and the death toll at a relatively low level, but on the other 
hand they led to a considerable social backlash, widespread exhaustion with the restrictions and a 
growing suspicion that the risks of COVID-19 were exaggerated. This popular feeling was further 
strengthened by the government’s decision, to lift a number of restrictions just after Easter. The 
government, unable to keep the country locked-down, announced its four-stage plan on April 16th. 
That decision, unrelated to the number of infections which still oscillated between 250 and 500 (with 
occasional peaks), only strengthened those suspicions and contributed to a more relaxed approach to 
the existing limitations among the general public. The most recent changes included lifting the 
obligation to cover the mouth and nose in some public places (since May 30th) or opening gyms or 
swimming pools (from June 6th). Accordingly, in Poland there was no clear mitigation of contagion 
phase which could be distinguished on the basis of the clear and visible drop of the number of daily 
cases of infection. Such state of affairs was exploited by PO and PSL and their candidates to 
emphasize the incumbent’s inability to effectively deal with the crisis. The debate was fuelled on 
May by the revelations regarding the purchase of defective and overpriced medical equipment by 
Health Minister, Szumowski.  
 
Figure 9.1 Daily death toll and new cases in Poland 
Source: European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control 
Phase 1: pre-Covid-19; Phase 2: spread and containment measures 
 
 
Table 9.2 COVID-19 pandemic in Poland by 10 June 2020  
Cases 27,842 
Total deaths 1,206 
Total recovered 13,411 
Cases per 1 million 736 
Deaths per 1 million 32 
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3. Populist discourse at the time of COVID-19 
Political discourse during the COVID-19 pandemic in Poland has been determined by two contextual 
factors. The first was the difference in institutional position. PiS, as a major government party, was 
expected to design and implement an efficient response to the spread of the virus. Confederation, the 
smallest party in parliament, with no prospects of changing its place as the opposition in the nearest 
future, had more room for radical criticism. The second factor was the struggle between PiS and the 
rest of the parties over the date of the presidential election, which coincided with or even 
overshadowed any debate on COVID-19.  
The ruling party attempted to use the discourse about COVID-19 to strengthen support for PiS, which 
in turn was intended to produce public support for Duda. The discursive construction of the people 
was based on references to the nation, Poles or the citizens. Particularly in the first two phases, PiS 
deliberately withdrew the antagonistic aspects of its discourse, emphasizing the necessity to keep 
national unity. The Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki, referred to the topos of the national history: 
‘The coronavirus threat is a matter beyond all divisions – at this moment political disputes have no 
meaning and I will categorically stop all such narratives. In the face of the coronavirus, Polish society 
should be and is one. […] Let us remember that the history of Poland teaches us one thing – when 
we are divided, we are vulnerable to external threats, but when united in a common fight, we have 
always emerged victorious from all the trials we have been faced with as a nation’ (Morawiecki 
Facebook page, 11/03/20). Moreover, the discourse on COVID-19 provided an opportunity to bolster 
national pride through permanent references to other countries, particularly in Europe. Poland was 
represented not only as able to help Italy in its critical situation, but as an example for other states: 
‘Today, Poland is at the absolute top of the world when it comes to the speed and efficiency of 
decisions. We prefer to prevent than cure. […] Economic powers such as the United Kingdom, 
Germany and the United States have followed the path we have set out’ (Morawiecki Facebook page, 
24/03/20). References to the people and Poland were used to portray the government as an advocate 
of the people, listening to its opinions, responding to their problems and making proper decisions. 
Unsurprisingly, such references were used many times to legitimize a government package of 
economic measures known as the Anti-Crisis Shield. 
As regards Confederation, although the party decided to moderate its image and resigned from the 
most controversial forms of othering, its oppositional status was expressed through unrelenting anti-
elitism. Accordingly, the people were mainly represented as victims of inadvertently or deliberately 
incorrect decisions made by the elites. The people’s health was neglected by PiS pushing towards the 
elections despite the pandemic: ‘Security and human life is of little importance to them, as is equality 
of citizens before the law, all that matters to them is political interest and election victory, at any 
cost’ (Confederation Facebook page, 6/04/20). According to Confederation, the people’s needs and 
interests were fully disregarded by the elites conspiring over the people’s heads. One notable example 
of this conspiracy was the government’s anti-crisis’ measures derided as ‘a lifebuoy made of concrete’ 
(in Polish, this expression denotes apparent help which in practice makes the situation of the receiver 
even more difficult – AL) and a ‘bureaucratic catastrophe’ (Confederation Facebook page, 1/04/20).  
The simultaneous occurrence of the pandemic and the elections attenuated the willingness of PiS to 
resort to anti-elitism. Contrary to the previous 2019 elections, PiS initially strived to moderate its 
image to avoid being perceived as focusing merely on political matters instead of existential health-
related issues. Consequently, in the first two phases, PiS suspended its criticism of the elites. This 
changed with the growing tension over PiS' reluctance to delay the elections coupled with the fact 
that the liberal party, Civic Platform (PO), replaced its presidential candidate Małgorzata Kidawa-
Błońska with the mayor of Warsaw, Rafał Trzaskowski. Trzaskowski could easily be targeted as part 
of the urban, well educated, and liberal elite. Anti-elitism was employed not only by the incumbent 
President Duda, but also by the Prime Minister Morawiecki: ‘Is Poland supposed to be the Poland of 
elites [...] who want to serve foreigners in a comprador manner, or is it supposed to be the Poland of 
all Poles, even those who were forgotten, left on the margins of the transformation process? For us, 
 
 
the answer is clear’56. Another line of criticism was directed against the EU, accused of showing a 
lack of interest and having a slow response to the COVID-19 pandemic. These fallacious assumptions 
were subsequently used to construct an argument supporting the concept that a loose network of 
nation states (‘The Europe of the fatherlands’) would be more suited to dealing with the crisis57. 
Contrary to PiS, the discourse of Confederation was entirely based on the antagonistic representation 
of the elite, the system and the establishment, frequently referring to the other parliamentary parties 
as ‘the gang of four’. Confederation attempted to pit the people against the elites by exploiting the 
health crisis and PiS' efforts not to postpone the elections. According to Confederation, the other 
parties and their candidates were only interested in petty political games. They ignored the real 
problems of the people, were unwilling to represent their interests, and used the COVID-19 pandemic 
to strengthen their power and pursue their own narrow interests. Their discursive construction of the 
crisis was based on emotionally charged labels and arguments, frequently resorting to extremely 
negative blame attributions. Sometimes Confederation went as far as to imply the betrayal of the 
people by the elites: ‘Companies go bankrupt, workers are laid off, millions of Poles worry about 
their future, and POPiS (acronym for PO and PiS, suggesting their collusion – AL) ignores this and 
instead of helping citizens in this difficult time, they turn their backs on entrepreneurs and workers, 
condemning them to difficult months and years ahead. Is this still the Polish government?!’ 
(Confederation Facebook Profile, 1/04/20). Interestingly, in their attempts to moderate the image of 
the party, they portrayed the elites as careless, ignorant, and provoking panic, in contrast to 
Confederation who are sensible, meritocratic, and focused on people’s interests instead of power 
games. 
Accordingly, contrary to previous electoral campaigns, references to the ‘others’ were virtually non-
existent in Confederation's discourse. The same applied to PiS in the first two phases of the crisis. In 
the third phase, however, when confronted with Trzaskowski who was known for supporting the 
rights of the LGBT community, Duda decided to present himself as a defender of traditional family 
values through attacks on the LGBT community. Interestingly, the aim of PiS to protect Polish 
families from COVID-19 was occasionally articulated together with homophobic discourse defining 
LGBT as an ‘ideology’ that was ‘worse than communism’58.  
 
 
4. The politicization of COVID-19 issue by populists 
The context of the electoral campaign and PiS’ reluctance to delay the elections has contributed to 
the rapid politicization of the issue by the opposition. Initially, PiS was interested in securing the 
broadest support and legitimacy necessary to successfully implement radical pre-emptive measures 
and build an image of competence and professionalism in dealing with the epidemic. As time went 
on, they increasingly resorted to polarization, a politics of fear and adoption of the law in a 
majoritarian fashion.  
Confederation's strategy was much more ambiguous. On one hand, they were interested in shaking 
off their image as an ideologically driven party of radicals and eccentrics and win the electorate over 
as a group with a perfectly normal, mainstream, right-wing identity. On the other hand, as the main 
rival of PiS on the right, they aimed at attacking the government and President. Consequently, the 
strategy was based on calculated ambivalence where rhetorical appeals to sensibility, common sense, 
and constructive proposals on how to combat the epidemic were accompanied by a fierce criticism 
of the incumbents. 
 
56 M. Morawiecki, Sprawozdanie Stenograficzne z 12. posiedzenia Sejmu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w dniu 4 czerwca 
2020 r. 
57 A. Mierzyńska, Unia bierna wobec koronawirusa? Manipulacje i ignorancja wiceministra Kowalskiego, OKO Press, 
17/04/2020. 




In the emergence phase, the governing PiS strived to depoliticize the issue of the pandemic by 
emphasizing its own efforts to manage the situation, assuring the public that Poland is fully prepared 
to face COVID-19, providing detailed information about what steps have been and will be taken, and 
appealing to political parties for national unity: ‘Calm and professionalism – this is what we need the 
most today. So let's not get caught up in attempts to politicize this problem. […] As Prime Minister, 
I will not allow the health of Poles to be a matter of political games!’ (Morawiecki Facebook page, 
2/03/20). Significantly, attempts to take the issue of the pandemic off the political agenda were 
coupled with messages highlighting the problem of fake news about COVID-19 and how it might 
provoke panic in society. However, already at this phase, PiS and President Duda attempted to use 
the health crisis as an opportunity to present the incumbent president as a leader in the battle against 
the virus. 
Although Confederation rejected the special act on COVID-19 adopted in the emergence phase, it 
portrayed itself as a meritocratic party, willing to debate the technical issues related to the threat of 
COVID-19, and refraining from blame games. During a special session of Parliament, its presidential 
candidate, Bosak, was even admonishing the oppositional PO for spreading conspiracy theories. In 
line with its calculated strategy of ambivalence, the group took an even more radical stance on 
Facebook by attacking the parliamentarians for conspiring against society and using the threat of 
COVID-19 as an opportunity to limit civic freedom and undermine the free market (Confederation 
Facebook page, 1/04/20). 
The confrontation phase started on March 28th, triggered by PiS’ attempts to hold the elections despite 
serious doubts about its safety. PiS decided to push through amendments to the electoral law which 
would allow it to organise elections while still being able to refute accusations of exposing Poles to 
danger. The amendment, part of the Anti-Crisis Shield, would allow people over 60 and those in 
quarantine or self-isolation to use postal voting. Importantly, the amendment infringed on the ruling 
of the Constitutional Tribunal according to which significant changes to the electoral law should be 
made at least six months before elections are called59. In its efforts to secure the re-election of its 
candidate before the expected economic consequences of the lockdown affected public support for 
Duda, PiS went a step further. On the 6th of April the Sejm (the lower chamber of the Polish 
parliament) adopted a bill that would allow people to vote in the May election exclusively by postal 
vote. In the meantime, PiS politicians were threatening that the consequences of not having an 
election would be dire and accused oppositional parties of wreaking havoc and breaking democratic 
rules. As Duda put it: ‘If we don't elect the President, the country will plunge into chaos’60. The 
critical comments and legal response of EU officials and institutions were met with similarly inimical 
reactions, with the EU being accused of interfering with internal democratic processes61. Ultimately, 
due to the split in the governing coalition, the bill was not approved. Subsequently, the Polish 
parliament adopted a new electoral law that allowed Poles to either vote traditionally or through postal 
voting. Moreover, the first round was rescheduled for the 28th of June, which opened a new and even 
more polarized phase of the campaign. The parliamentary debate over the law provided the 
oppositional parties the opportunity to criticize PiS for the legal chaos and alleged willingness to 
introduce authoritarian system. 
During the confrontation phase, Confederation consistently demanded the delay of the presidential 
elections, aware that a drop in the public opinion polls for Duda might easily translate into support 
for their own presidential candidate. Consequently, Bosak was among the first to announce the claim: 
‘Let's postpone the election, let's not use the pandemic to make politics! […] Calling millions of Poles 
to polling stations during the #coronavirus pandemic is a recipe for mass infections and deaths’ 
(Confederation Facebook page, 15/03/20). Moreover, the strict epidemic measures and a difficult 
 
59 D. Tilles, Changes to electoral code paving way for May presidential elections passed by Polish parliament, Notes 
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60 A. Duda, Bez wyborów kraj będzie w chaosie, Gazeta Polska, 22/04/2020. 




economic situation opened a discursive window of opportunity for Confederation's radically 
libertarian agenda. Initially, it politicized the crisis by criticizing PiS’ response to COVID-19 as too 
slow, and then went on to reveal the weaknesses and oppressiveness of the allegedly socialist state 
built by PiS as too restrictive towards ordinary citizens and overly bureaucratic towards small 
entrepreneurs.  
The managing phase was inextricably linked to previous phases. PiS quite rapidly started to blame 
the opposition for trying to destabilize the country and undermine democracy, and boasted of its 
efforts to manage the economic ramifications of the health crisis. The measures implemented by the 
four editions of the ‘Anti-Crisis Shield’ were key. The most important of these included the temporary 
exemption of micro-entrepreneurs and the self-employed from obligatory monthly social security 
payments, financial benefits for the self-employed, subsidies for employees’ wages, and enabling 
CIT and PIT taxpayers who bore the negative consequences of COVID-19 to deduct the loss incurred 
in 2020 from operating income generated in 2019. Confederation, striving to present itself as a 
constructive opposition during parliamentary sessions and through social media communication, 
consistently listed a number of measures which should have been taken by the government and 
insisted their demands be taken into account by the governing majority. Moreover, in line with its 
libertarian agenda, Confederation demanded an immediate lift of lockdown-related restrictions, huge 
tax reductions for entrepreneurs, and the compensation of salaries not paid by companies whose 




The COVID-19 crisis had a significant impact on the strategies undertaken by PiS during the 
presidential campaign. Initially, given the weakness of the original Civic Platform candidate and the 
high level of public support for the incumbent Duda, PiS had reason to believe that Duda was on track 
for an inevitable landslide victory. The outbreak of the epidemic opened a public discussion on the 
possibility of delaying the elections and prompted PiS to take unconstitutional measures to prevent 
such a scenario. The party feared the unforeseen consequences of the crisis, which could negatively 
affect Duda’s chances of re-election. However, the crisis also opened a window of opportunity for 
the governing camp. In the first phase, preceding the outbreak of the crisis, PiS strived for 
depoliticization to strengthen the ‘rally effect’, with worried citizens united behind government calls 
for national unity. In addition, restrictive measures against the epidemic created an uneven political 
struggle, evidently strengthening the incumbent president. This, however, entailed fierce political 
antagonisms in the subsequent phases, strong politicization of the dispute, and the use of all possible 
means to push through the elections as scheduled. As a result, PiS could now be criticized as a party 
that wanted to use the epidemic for political purposes, and the issue of postponing the elections 
revealed divisions in the United Right coalition power camp.  
As for Confederation, the crisis did not fundamentally affect its strategy for becoming more 
mainstream. The group used the pandemic to build the image of a competent and moderate actor able 
to offer concrete policy solutions. In addition, the restrictions of the crisis created an opportunity for 
the libertarian message of the Confederation. Moreover, the Confederation skilfully used its 
calculated ambivalence to secure the support of its radical electorate. With regard to the polls, in the 
period under consideration, there was a clear and steady increase in support for both Law and Justice 
and Duda. During the containment phase, Duda even saw his poll rating exceed 56%. Finally, the 
crisis did not significantly improve the social support for Confederation, which oscillated between 
6% and 9%62. The first round of elections held on June 28 confirmed the electoral support for Bosak 
and his party, providing him 6,78% of the votes. The prolonged, exhaustive campaign, legally 
doubtful (to say the least) decisions of PiS and scandals over medical equipment purchases coupled 
with the dynamic campaign of the new PO candidate Trzaskowski contributed to the relatively weak 
 
62 Source: https://www.politico.eu/europe-poll-of-polls/poland/ 
 
 
result of Duda. Although he was able to secure 43,5% of the votes in a first round of elections and 
Trzaskowski only 30,46%, in a second-round run-off he won only with a narrow margin of 51% to 
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